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Theorists have long noted that people’s moral circles have expanded over the course of 
history, with modern people extending moral concern to entities—both human and 
nonhuman—that our ancestors would never have considered including within their moral 
boundaries. In recent decades, researchers have sought a comprehensive understanding 
of the psychology of moral expansiveness. We first review the history of conceptual and 
methodological approaches in understanding our moral boundaries, with a particular 
focus on the recently developed Moral Expansiveness Scale. We then explore individual 
differences in moral expansiveness, attributes of entities that predict their inclusion in 
moral circles, and cognitive and motivational factors that help explain what we include 
within our moral boundaries and why they may shrink or expand. Throughout, we 











Modern moral sensibilities have expanded far beyond the standards of past generations. 
Along a familiar path to the rights revolutions of the 20th century (e.g., civil rights, gay 
rights; Pinker, 2011), we continue to observe illustrations of what some refer to as 
society’s moral progression. These historical shifts have raised ethical dilemmas that 
were unthinkable for our ancestors. Today, hundreds of millions believe it is unethical to 
consume animal products, a practice our species has engaged in for millennia. Across the 
globe, advocacy groups are campaigning to see chimpanzees obtain basic human rights 
(Greenwood, 2013) and have successfully fought for elements of the natural environment 
to be given the same rights we give people (ABC, 2017). Moreover, a growing number of 
people believe they have an unwavering ethical obligation to offer half their livelihoods 
to save the lives of complete strangers (Singer, 2015). In short, our moral circles are 
expanding. 
Although this trend has been noted by prominent theorists (Bloom, 2010; 
McFarland, 2011; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981), the psychology of moral expansion has 
only relatively recently been given due consideration. Empirical research to date has 
identified determinants of moral inclusion (Opotow, 1993), shown that moral boundary 
judgments are flexible (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Laham, 2009), 
and revealed that individual differences in moral expansiveness are a powerful predictor 
of decision making and behavior (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016). 
Theoretical work has considered a range of topics to explain why people differ in how 
broadly they extend their moral concern; these topics include potential drivers of moral 
change (e.g., contact and persuasion; Bloom, 2010), the tension between resource 
conflicts and expansive moral decision making (Bastian & Crimston, 2016), and the 
impact of competing moral motivations on moral consideration (Graham, Waytz, Meindl, 
Iyer, & Young, 2017). 
We have two goals in the current article. The first is to review the recent history 
of conceptual and methodological approaches for understanding moral boundaries, with a 
particular focus on a recently developed scale of moral expansiveness. The second is to 
assess evidence of variability in moral expansiveness. In doing so, we examine the 
question: When and why do people’s moral circles shrink or expand? 
Moral Expansiveness: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches 
The term moral circle is often used to denote the breadth of people’s moral concern for 
others, particularly the boundary distinguishing entities that are worthy of moral concern 
from those that are not (Singer, 1981). Initial explorations treated the boundaries of a 
person’s moral circle as binary, with people selecting those entities they would include or 
exclude from their moral circle depending on the perception that they were worthy or 
unworthy of moral concern (Bastian, Costello, et al., 2012; Laham, 2009). Using an 
alternative approach, Schwartz (2007) inferred the scope of people’s moral circles by 
asking them to endorse specific “moral” values as guiding principles in their lives (e.g., 
valuing equality or protecting the environment). Other approaches to understanding 
moral concern for others have focused on specific entities, often involving more graded 
and continuous judgments about the extent of moral concern. For example, Opotow 
(1990) revealed a collection of attitudes that determine moral inclusion: (a) believing that 
considerations of fairness apply, (b) a willingness to share community resources, and (c) 
a willingness to make sacrifices in order to foster well-being. Others have examined how 
strongly people value entities typically considered to lie at the periphery of moral circles, 
as expressed by people’s identification with all humanity (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 
2012); solidarity with, and moral inclusion of, animals (Amiot & Bastian, 2015; Opotow, 
1993); and connectedness to nature (Mayer & Frantz, 2004). 
In sum, existing measures have typically focused on many entities but used 
dichotomous judgments or have used continuous judgments but focused on specific 
targets. What these approaches lack is an overall perspective on how broadly (and 
intensely) people extend moral concern across an extensive range of entities. The Moral 
Expansiveness Scale (MES; Crimston et al., 2016) was designed to capture this breadth 
and depth of moral consideration. It examines a wide range of entities (typical of the 
original moral circle approach) and combines this with a graded conception of moral 
concern, varying from basic moral rights to deep and personally binding moral 
obligations. The MES also incorporates consideration of the potential costs of moral 
inclusion (e.g., time and money to benefit the welfare of others; Opotow, 1993; Singer, 
1981). This approach allows for novel examinations of the structure, limits, and 
predictive power of moral expansiveness. 
In the MES, breadth is achieved by asking participants to make judgments about a 
representative spread of human and nonhuman entities (e.g., family and friends, out-
group members, animals, plants, the environment). Depth is measured by placing entities 
within four defined boundaries expressing the extent of moral concern afforded to them, 
as well as the willingness to defend these convictions and the cost of doing so.1 These 
four boundaries of moral consideration are graded, with the aggregate score indicating 
the overall expansiveness of an individual’s moral world (Crimston et al., 2016). 
Using the MES, we found a reliable structure of moral priorities (see Fig. 1; 
Crimston et al., 2016). People have a tendency to put their family and friends at the 
center of their moral circle, with other human groups afforded lower levels of priority. In-
group members are more central than out-group members, followed by highly sentient 
animals, the environment, animals with low sentience, and plants (villains, interestingly, 
often lie outside people’s moral circles altogether). These overall tendencies, however, 
obscure a wide range of variability, with some individuals holding expansive moral 
boundaries that lie outside of what Singer (1981) specified as biologically predictable 
(i.e., beyond one’s devotion to kin and in-group). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Normative pattern of entities on the moral circle, as indicated by ratings on the Moral Expansiveness 
Scale (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016). Family and friends are at the center of the circle, where 
moral concern is greatest (9.00); other entities rank lower depending on how strongly they figure in 
individuals’ moral priorities. (Figure reprinted from Crimston et al., 2016.) 
The aggregate MES score can be a powerful predictor of altruistic moral decision 
making. Over and above established moral constructs,2 the MES predicted the 
willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and 
national self-interest, a willingness to donate resources to protect the lives of entities in 
need (e.g., financial and kidney donations), volunteering, and the willingness to sacrifice 
one’s life to save others (Crimston et al., 2016). In short, moral expansiveness captures a 
unique dimension of our moral cognition, and the MES offers a useful tool to examine 
the implications of more expansive (or restrictive) moral worlds. 
Variability in Moral Expansiveness 
Why do some people cast wider moral boundaries than others, and when do our moral 
boundaries shrink or expand? An emerging body of ideas and studies has examined 
variability in moral expansiveness and the mechanisms responsible for it. This literature 
can be separated into four areas: (a) individual differences in moral expansiveness, (b) 
cognitive factors that influence decision making, (c) motivational factors, and (d) target 
attributes that influence perceptions of moral standing. 
Individual Differences 
Theorists have proposed that empathy, compassion, perspective taking, creativity, loyalty 
to one’s in-group, moral identity, and egalitarian values may all contribute to the 
variation we see in the scope of moral boundaries (Bloom, 2010; Graham et al., 2017; 
Pinker, 2011; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Singer, 1981). We found evidence to support many 
of these claims (Crimston et al., 2016). Across multiple studies, greater moral 
expansiveness was associated with increased empathic concern, perspective taking, moral 
identity, identification with all of humanity, connection with nature, endorsement of 
universalism values, and increased use of harm and fairness principles as foundations for 
moral decision making (see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Not only were these 
individual difference variables associated with higher MES scores, but many were also 
positively associated with other indices of moral expansiveness, such as volunteering 
behavior and the willingness to sacrifice one’s life in order to protect human and 
nonhuman others. Conversely, scores on the MES tended to be lower the more people 
endorsed loyalty and purity as moral foundations, suggesting that those who prioritize in-
group over out-group concerns and who are prone to viewing moral issues through the 
lens of disgust and contamination have more restrictive moral boundaries. 
When considering variability in the scope of moral boundaries, we acknowledge 
that the impact of situational influences is likely dependent on trait-level moral 
expansiveness. Specifically, it seems plausible that individuals with low moral 
expansiveness will be more susceptible to forces that shape the limits of moral 
boundaries. For example, the motivation to restrict moral concern under conditions of 
conflicting needs (e.g., concern over the well-being of animals vs. desirability of 
consuming animal products) is likely to be stronger among people with low moral 
expansiveness, compared with those with high moral expansiveness. 
Cognitive Factors 
Moral boundary judgments are susceptible to a variety of subtle and often unconscious 
cognitive influences. For example, the size of our moral circle can shift depending on the 
mind-set we adopt; deciding which entities to exclude from moral consideration produces 
larger moral circles than deciding which entities to include (Laham, 2009). Moreover, 
adopting an exclusion mind-set can produce spillover effects that can influence future 
moral judgments. For example, when deciding whether various nonhuman animals 
should be excluded from our moral circles, we are subsequently more likely to increase 
our moral concern toward human out-groups (i.e., different ethnicities and beliefs). 
Similarly, the ease with which we can retrieve entities that are potentially worthy of 
moral inclusion subsequently increases the size of our moral circles: Laham (2013) found 
that participants who were asked to generate 3 moral circle exemplars reported larger 
moral circles than participants who had the more challenging task of generating 15. 
Further evidence suggests that inclusion within our moral circle can be influenced by 
framing effects; for example, comparing animals with humans results in more expansive 
moral concern than the reverse, comparing humans with animals (Bastian, Costello, et al., 
2012). 
Motivational Factors 
The decisions we make regarding another entity’s moral worth can shift as a result of 
motivational influences. For example, to reduce cognitive dissonance associated with 
harming conscious beings, we are less likely to incorporate animals within our moral 
boundary if we are about to consume meat (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012). 
Similarly, we are more likely to deny an entity moral standing if its needs conflict with 
our own, such as when there is a conflict of interest over a scarce resource (e.g., 
economically valuable land vs. animal habitat; Opotow, 1993). In line with realistic-
conflict theory, situations in which competition over scarce resources is high can prime 
out-group biases (Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 2012) and increase the perception that out-
group members are exploitable and undeserving (Opotow, 1990). 
Mortality salience can also motivate us to reconsider our moral priorities. Terror 
management theory posits that in order to reduce the anxiety associated with this 
existential threat, we are more likely to emphasize our own cultural worldviews and 
prioritize in-group concerns. As a consequence, being primed with reminders of our own 
mortality can lead to the exclusion of out-group members (Castano, 2004) and increased 
distinction between humans and nonhumans (Beatson, Loughnan, & Halloran, 2009). 
Equally, we can be motivated by factors that increase our moral circle. Building 
on the finding that the association that empathy and compassion can increase moral 
concern (Graham et al., 2017; Pinker, 2011), research has shown that inducing empathic 
states can reduce negative attitudes toward stigmatized out-groups (Batson et al., 1997). 
Further, motivation to expand our moral boundaries can appear in contexts in which our 
basic needs have been satisfied. Studies have found an association between motivation to 
engage in prosocial behavior (e.g., donating and volunteering) and self-reported 
relatedness, autonomy, and competence (Gagné, 2003). Similarly, experimental research 
has shown that increasing participants’ feelings of relatedness and connection with others 
results in increased intentions to volunteer (Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2011; but see 
Waytz & Epley, 2012). 
Target Attributes 
Our decisions regarding the moral worth of human and nonhuman entities (targets) also 
depend on perceptions of whether they possess morally relevant attributes. Most 
prominently, the extent to which certain qualities of entities trigger the perception that 
they are in possession of a mind is strongly linked to our attribution of moral rights to 
these entities (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). When we “see” minds—and, in turn, the 
capacity to feel pain, pleasure, or fear—we are more likely to extend greater moral 
concern to those entities. 
Our moral circles may shrink in situations conducive to dehumanizing others. 
When entities (human or otherwise) are portrayed as lacking fundamental human traits 
such as emotionality, warmth, or higher cognition (Bain, 2014), this can reduce our 
willingness to defend these entities if they are treated immorally (Bastian, Laham, 
Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011). Similarly, when physical appearance becomes a focus 
(for any gender), objectification can lead to depersonalization, reduced mind perception, 
and a denial of personhood and moral status (Loughnan et al., 2010). In contrast, when 
certain targets are especially amenable to anthropomorphism—whereby distinctly human 
capacities of intentionality and emotion are attributed to them—we are more likely to 
afford these entities moral care and concern (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010). 
Likewise, perceived similarity with humans has been found to influence the moral 
inclusion of nonhuman animals and elements of the natural environment (Opotow, 1993, 
1994). 
Conclusion 
There seems little doubt that people’s moral boundaries have been expanding over time. 
Equally, we see great variation in moral-boundary decision making. The existing research 
demonstrates the extent to which moral expansiveness can vary across people and 
situations, emphasizing the graded, impressionable, and fluid nature of our moral 
boundaries. This emerging body of work not only represents a unique element of moral 
cognition, but also has substantial practical consequences. Social inequality, competition 
for limited resources, and demand for global humanitarian and environmental action are 
growing. The psychology of moral expansiveness can help us navigate through the tricky 
moral terrain associated with these global changes, identifying barriers to moral concern 
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(“these entities deserve moderate moral concern and consideration . . . however, moral 
obligation is reduced”), the fringes of moral concern (“these entities deserve minimal 
moral concern and standing . . . [there is] no personal moral obligation”), and an area 
outside the moral boundary (“these entities deserve no moral standing . . . concern for 
their moral treatment is nonsensical”). These boundaries are graded as follows: inner 
circle = 3, outer circle = 2, fringes of moral concern = 1, outside the moral boundary = 0 
(Crimston et al., 2016). 
 
2. The MES added predictive value over and above the following established moral 
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